tribal councils
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How to Interpret the ASG Report and Blog
Published: April 18th, 2011
Author: Edward KenneyEdward Kenney Afghanistan Study Group
An expert on Afghanistan recently brought up two interesting critiques of the Afghanistan Study Group. The first concerns the nature of the war—is it an ethnic or political conflict? The second concerns the appropriateness of drawing parallels between war costs and economic and social problems here at home. Both issues are worth discussing in greater depth.
Ethnicities, Tribes, and Politics
First, to state the obvious, suggesting that the Afghan conflict is partly ethnic is not the same thing as saying Taliban are an ethnically homogenous group, (a conclusion that Study Group Director Matthew Hoh has repeatedly rejected). The ASG Report says the conflict is
“1) partly ethnic, chiefly, but not exclusively, between Pashtuns who dominate the south and other ethnicities such as Tajiks and Uzbeks who are more prevalent in the north, 2) partly rural vs. urban, particularly within the Pashtun community, and 3) partly sectarian”.
This, to me, seems like a fair statement although more emphasis should have probably been placed on the importance of tribal divisions. The fact that we identify the Taliban in south and east as predominately Pashtun, and insurgent groups in the north as primarily Uzbek, highlights the ethnic component of the conflict[i]. But ethnicity, as this report indicates, is by no means the sole point of contention. The war is highly complex, with multiple layers and multiple sides. In some areas of Afghanistan, the conflict is best described as a Hatfield and McCoy type “sectarian” feud between families, clans and villages. The United States invaded Afghanistan without understanding this complexity; it is unclear whether either those who support continuation of the COIN strategy, or those who favor peace talks have come to grips with this.
But there is a broader point here that some “experts” ignore at their peril: Politics in Afghanistan are woven into ethnic and tribal identities. You cannot separate the two. Anand Gopal explains this linkage better than anyone:
“…tribal identity is still an important mechanism through which individual interests are negotiated. In Southern Afghanistan’s system of largely informal networks, a shared tribal or clan background with the holders of power means access to state services, resources , and more.”
Gopal concludes that marginalized tribes “formed the recruiting base for the Taliban.” Even noted historian and anthropologist Thomas Barfield, who comes down strongly in favor of rural vs. urban explanation for the conflict, agrees that in Afghan politics “tribal and ethnic groups take primacy over the individual”.
Yes, political grievances are at the heart of the insurgency, but these political grievances reflect complex ethnic and regional dynamics. To suggest that the Afghan conflict is political and not ethnic or tribal is to fundamentally misunderstand Afghan politics. This is not a trivial error. If political reconciliation is the best hope for peace going forward, longstanding ethnic and regional tensions have to be addressed, or we risk further exacerbating the conflict. Indeed, trying to separate politics from tribal and regional dynamics is undoubtedly an exercise in determined ignorance.
Drawing Parallels between Afghanistan and U.S.: Does it Make Sense?
Will Thomas has written a number of blogs highlighting how the costs of the war reflect a society whose priorities are out of whack. My personal favorite compares Marjah in Afghanistan to Camden New Jersey, one of the most violent cities in the United States. But does this parallel make sense? Camden has a local government. What does it have to do with the federally funded war?
First, (again to state the obvious), Will Thomas was clearly not suggesting that the money for Afghanistan could be immediately reallocated to New Jersey. The point of the post was to broadly illustrate America’s skewed priorities. Second, more importantly, federal funds do go towards local communities like Camden all the time. Just last year, the stimulus spent over 77 million dollars in Camden and federal funds have frequently supported local police and firefighters elsewhere. The 2011 budget agreement is cutting a $52 million program to help municipalities hire police and firefighters. One city that benefited from this program…you guessed it, Camden New Jersey.
There is a real question as to how much good an extra $100+ billion a year could do to stop urban decay in the United States, and no one is suggesting that pulling out of Afghanistan will solve all our social problems. There may well be other priorities, but that’s the point. We need to be asking hard questions about how best to spend our limited resources—a failing war in Afghanistan is probably not the answer.
[i] To be clear the insurgents are identified by their ethnicity, not their political affiliation (Maoist) or even religion (Sunni versus Shia). This suggests that ethnicity is the most important identifier.Tags: exit strategy, negotiation, reconciliation, strategy, tribal councils
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America’s role in Afghanistan – a quiet one
Published: December 17th, 2009
Author: Michael Shank
