International Crisis Group Offers Not So Rosy Picture of Progress in Afghanistan
Edward Kenney
Afghanistan Study Group Blogger
The International Crisis Group (ICG) released a policy paper in November. The introduction provides a sobering assessment of the war in Afghanistan, which is contrary to the rosy reports of progress the administration is favoring.
“While success is being measured in numbers of insurgents killed or captured,
there is little proof that the operations have disrupted the insurgency’s
momentum or increased stability. The storyline does not match facts on the ground.”
What are the “facts on the ground”? ICG describes in some detail the increased violence, the inadequacy of Afghan Security Forces, and the graft and ineffectiveness of the Afghan government in Kabul. The problem, suggests the ICG, is that the U.S. policy is wrong headed:
“The exit strategy sounds fairly simple: try to pound the Taliban, build support by protecting
civilians, lure disillusioned Taliban over to the government, expand access to basic services and create
resilient security forces. The problem is that none of this is working.”
Up to this point the ICG report seems to echo many of the points the Afghanistan Study Group has made. Further along it blames bureaucrats and timelines for what is going wrong in Afghanistan:
“Chains of command for both decision making and the monitoring of
outcomes have been unclear, in part due to a proliferation of ambassador-level
diplomats, war czars, special envoys and generals.”
The ICG believes that too many people are involved in the decision-making. While this could indeed be a problem, evidence for such a claim is missing. The paragraph goes on to say:
“Whatever policy there was has been undercut by President Obama’s
call for a July 2011 drawdown, which erased any belief on the ground
that there was a commitment to stay the course”
This oft-repeated argument against timetables presumes that absent a clearly defined exit strategy, the Afghan government would assume that U.S. commitment is open-ended. In other words, that the U.S. can perpetually dupe Karzai into believing we have his back. The reality, of course, is that the U.S. commitment to Afghanistan was never open-ended, a fact which is recognized by U.S. and Afghan policymakers alike. The question is not whether or not to utilize timelines. The question is whether the U.S. plans for an orderly withdrawal from Afghanistan or a chaotic one. In this case, the former is clearly the better alternative.
This ICG paper is that it is much better at diagnosing the problems in Afghanistan, than offering real solutions. In particular, the paper is quick to discount the prospects of a negotiated settlement, resting it’s argument on dubious assumptions.
1. “Talks with the Taliban have been going on for years at every possible level. These negotiations have failed because the Taliban believed that they were winning militarily”
The Taliban were certainly not winning between 2001 and 2006. Even as the insurgency has grown, the likelihood that the Taliban could march on Kabul and retake the government the way they did in the 1990s has remained remote. The Taliban are still reviled by most Afghans and their powerbase remains confined in the south. Negotiations have failed for a far simpler reason. The U.S.—the proverbial elephant in the room—has steadfastly refused to cooperate.
2. “Deal-making even in the shape of reintegration, let alone reconciliation, will not address the many problems that Afghan citizens face…rule of law will be undermined, warlordism encouraged and momentum on security sector reform reversed”
The Council on Foreign Relations Independent Task Force has a different view of reconciliation writing:
“The national reconciliation process offers a potential opening for
constitutional reform. Insurgent leaders have explicitly rejected the
present constitution and are unlikely to re-enter national politics without
certain amendments. The two political initiatives reform and
reconciliation—should therefore be managed in tandem”
The ICG has it completely backwards. In the present environment, rule of law is undermined and warlordism encouraged. It is only through the process of reconciliation that many necessary reforms are likely to take place. A functioning peace process is the best tool potential reformers have.
3. “If deals are made, particularly at the local level, they are likely to be temporary at best, mirroring the appeasement deals made by the Pakistani military…
This argument merely underscores the necessity of a broad based reconciliation effort that addresses the key grievances of the insurgency. Nothing else will work.
4. Only when access to sanctuaries and resources are cut off will there be an incentive for the Taliban leadership to accept a negotiated process.
Parties engaged in combat will have an incentive to enter negotiations if the cost of the conflict exceeds the payoff from a settlement. While the presence of resources and sanctuaries undoubtedly affects this cost-benefit analysis, their presence does not represent an insurmountable obstacle to peace. If it were, Karzai, who receives billions of dollars of “resources” from the U.S. would also refuse to negotiate.
Two factors suggest that political settlement is actually quite promising. First, the war is in a bloody stalemate with increasing costs in both blood and treasure for both sides. Neither the U.S. nor the Taliban has a clear path to victory. Second, the U.S. shares several strategic goals with the insurgency: a reduction of the U.S. footprint in Afghanistan and an increase in the “rule of law”[1]. The potential benefits from negotiated settlement could be quite high and the prospects of such a peace settlement may be much higher than most analysts expect.
Even if you believe that resources and sanctuaries are an insurmountable obstacle, the report offers no solution on how to deal with this the root of the problem: Pakistan. The Pakistanis view India as an existential threat to their country and see Afghanistan as a useful buffer. There is absolutely nothing the U.S. can do to change this strategic calculation. Holding out hope that the Pakistanis will see the error of their ways, as the report seems to suggest, is no way to conduct foreign policy.
The report also hints—it doesn’t say this directly—that Karzai must be removed from power for U.S. policy to succeed. Even though The Afghanistan Study Group has been as critical of the Afghan government we believe deposing Karzai is a dangerous suggestion. For all of his faults, Karzai remains the most popular politician in Afghanistan. Forcing Karzai out would only inflame sections of Afghanistan that currently support the US. Furthermore the Afghan governance problem is rooted in the country’s institutions. Shuffling the leadership does nothing to address the underlying problems.
[1] As Matt Waldman points out, the Taliban’s vision of “Rule of Law” does not correspond completely to the U.S.’s vision, but there is significant overlap.
