“Sigh”, There Goes Another Trillion Dollars
2014 is now the critical date for Afghanistan
The major news over the weekend was that the U.S. will present a blueprint for transitioning security to the Afghan National Army at the NATO summit in Lisbon with the hopes of ending combat operations in 2014.
First the obvious question: Is this a major shift from President Obama’s stated goal of beginning withdrawal in July 2011? The answer here is uncertain. The president will almost certainly make some token withdrawals next summer, but the administration has long maintained that the speed of withdrawal should be conditions based. In many respects, the new deadline for ending combat operations represents a harder deadline, than the July 1st withdrawal date which will likely be largely symbolic; however in the past, advisors close to the president had suggested that 2013 was the key date for ending combat operations, so on that front the news report is a step in wrong direction. Furthermore it remains to be seen whether 2014 is a “hard date” or to borrow a phrase from Mr. Obama’s predecessor, more of an “aspirational time horizon.”
Characteristically, the new 2014 deadline has set off a flurry of anxious writing throughout the Internet: Is the president backing out of his previous commitment to withdraw? Is he backing out of the COIN strategy before it has a chance to succeed? Much of this worry is misplaced. As Afghanistan Study Group Member Stephen Walt points out, the emphasis on timelines has always obscured the larger point: the current strategy is failing and a fundamental rethinking is necessary. Indeed, if the new timeline has any significance, it is that it will force President Obama to rethink the current strategy.
Afghanistan is almost as unimportant as education, CBS poll Suggests
Last week CBS released a post election poll on priorities for the next congress. Unsurprisingly, fixing the economy and jobs were overwhelmingly the top priority with 56% of those polled saying that congress should focus on this area. By contrast only two percent of the survey said the war in Iraq and Afghanistan should be a priority. On the bright side (I guess?), education, taxes and immigration fared equally badly.
There are a number of possible explanations for these results. First, as long as the economy remains depressed, Americans will focus their attention on jobs at the expense of all else. Second, the administration has favored continuity with the Bush administration on Afghanistan, so most Americans rightly feel they don’t have any real choice on the war. Third, the poll results may signal a loss of confidence in congress; especially since polls consistently show the public is dissatisfied with the way the war is going.
None of these factors is immutable. The economy may well recover; if the war continues to go badly, alternatives to the current strategy will be viewed increasingly with interest, and voter patience with an ineffectual congress is unlikely to last. All of this suggests that the politically pragmatic approach would be to carefully wind down the U.S. commitment in Afghanistan before the public remembers how dissatisfied it is with the war.
Karzai and Pakistan: Frenemies?
A news report and op-ed published recently, underscore the difficulty the U.S. faces in working with partners, all of which have their own agendas. The Washington Post reported yesterday that the relationship between Karzai and Petraeus has reached new lows after Karzai told the Washington Post he wanted a reduction in special operations in Southern Afghanistan. Karzai had angered Petraeus previously over the blocking of some high profile corruption cases, including one involving a close Karzai aid.
The real story here is not whether Karzai is justified in criticizing the night raids—he is. The real story is that the U.S. does not have a partner in Kabul. The counter-insurgency strategy is predicated on the notion that governance can be re-established in areas where the fighting is taking place. Without political allies in Kabul it is not clear that the U.S. can credibly establish an effective government, especially since many local provincial leaders are close to Karzai. A better option would be to redouble efforts at reconciliation and reform. Reconcile with key leaders in the insurgency so that a modicum of security can be achieved, and reform the constitution to decentralize power away from Kabul. As the Council on Foreign Relations notes, these efforts should be undertaken in tandem and can mutually reinforce each other.
Our second “partner” Pakistan has the ability to derail any peace process and must have a clear role in the negotiations. As Michael O’Hanlon notes in a recent op-ed, Pakistan’s goal is to install an anti-Hindu government in Afghanistan, a move which is clearly counter to U.S. interests. As far as Pakistan is concerned, Karzai and the Northern Alliance simply will not do. O’Hanlon’s plan is to dangle goodies such as free trade and nuclear technology for Pakistan in exchange for real cooperation in the counter-insurgency effort:
“The key point is this: Pakistan should be told that these deals will only be possible if the United States and its allies prevail in Afghanistan”
O’Hanlon does not elaborate on whether Pakistan is capable of ensuring coalition victory, or even what victory entails. (Does it require the complete dismantling of the Taliban?)
However, a modified version of the O’Hanlon approach could work. The reconciliation effort is the best hope for a resolution to the war in Afghanistan, but this effort will not succeed without the cooperation of Pakistan. The Obama administration should make clear to Islamabad that signing off on a reasonable peace deal will lead to U.S. cooperation in other areas such as energy policy and trade. Only through smart regional diplomacy can a peace deal between Karzai and the Taliban be made to last.
Last week I offered a first look at the Council Foreign Relations paper on U.S. Policy in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Today I look at the dissenting views in the appendix:
One group of foreign policy experts including David Barno, John Negroponte and John Keane among others argues in effect that any policy prescription calling for a troop withdrawal would “preemptively tie the president’s hands.” They argue for a comprehensive review in July prior to making any major decisions. It is true that some variables “cannot be foreseen nine months in advance,” but this fact should not preclude the administration from making withdraw plans. Indeed, if Obama were to take Barno et al’s suggestion to its logical conclusion, the administration would have to daily adapt its strategy to conditions on the ground—not a very efficient model for decision-making, and one that precludes the type grand strategic thinking necessary to protect long-term U.S. interests.
Robert Grenier and Joseph Collins both promote capacity building for the Afghan National Army despite coming from opposite directions. Collins feels that more expansive Counter-Insurgency strategy should be tried first before the “light footprint” tactics are attempted. Grenier believes that the current U.S. strategy “cannot succeed” and argues to immediately pursue the “light footprint” strategy. Both, however, argue that the training and development of the Afghan security forces is a critical factor for U.S. withdrawal. Grenier goes a step further, calling on the U.S. to work with “local militia leaders” to counter Taliban influence.
One of the weaknesses of the CFR document is that it doesn’t offer much help on how to successfully implement an alternative to COIN strategy. Training and mentorship programs—a key recommendation from the Afghanistan Study Group—are one important element to ensuring that the doomsday scenario presented in CFR[i] does not materialize. Another factor, which is disappointingly not discussed in the dissenting views, is a reconciliation effort with key members of the insurgency. After all, the greatest insurance against civil conflict is a power-sharing agreement acceptable to all sides.
[i] CFR says a light footprint could lead to increased terrorism, civil war, and even military confrontation between India and Pakistan.
